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| Integration of Maoists Combatants: Political gambit versus making the peace - Aug 11, 2008 |
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By Dilip Rayamajhi
Recently the United States of America celebrated their 60 Anniversary of US Military Integration. This may sound strange to many readers but the truth is before 1948 the US Military had segregated entities for African Americans. Although these citizens of the US proved their ample worth in valor and patriotism during most conflicts including the World Wars, they were segregated and treated discriminatorily. It was only after President Truman issued executive order 9981 on 26 July 1948 whereby all US servicemen were to be treated equally and granted equal opportunity, that the process to integrate and to end racial segregation started. However .it took another six years for the defense secretary to finally announce that there were no racially segregated units in the US Military.
This transformation in the US Military took place because of the pressure from civil rights movement and to prevent a potential conflict generating issue from bursting. Today in Nepal we are making peace after a decade long internal conflict and different but interrelated major issues that directly concerns the Nepal Army is the integration of Maoists combatants , inclusiveness of certain sects in its ranks and the political hue and cry about democratizing the institution. Although there is no similarity between the US context and the Nepalese context, in both cases the common denominators are the adherence to civil rights, prevention of potential conflicts and maintenance of peace.
The issue of integrating the Maoists combatants with the Nepal Army (NA) has been initiated by the concepts developed from the United Nation’s peace initiation models for conflicts in some parts of Africa. I would categorize these concepts as mere cosmetic actions because they have been successful in only masking certain issues to prevent further escalation of the conflict. The concepts of demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, rehabilitation, security sector reforms, reconstruction and etc. are some of the cosmetic concepts which the UN chalks out from time to time in bold underlined letters like DDR, SSR etc. These abbreviations or acronyms may sound very effective in making peace but they have not been as successful as projected in their literatures. In most cases the failure is linked to the imposition of Western standard processes without proper understanding of the culture, traditions, and sociopolitical environment of the conflict torn area. These processes usually follow the maxim “short term peace at all cost” and “short term peace eventually will foster lasting peace” even though it may raise dire consequences for the future. For example in the case of Nepal, it seems that the UN and other Western institutions want an early unconditional integration of Maoists combatants with the NA as an easy way out without due considerations of the future consequences. This is very much reflected in Mr. Kul Chandra Gautam’s article on the subject posted in the August 1, 2008 issue of The Kathmandu Post. Since his article is related partly to the subject of this work, making some comments would be relevant. However the aim of this note is not a critique of his article.
I feel that his suggestions were made in good faith for hastening the peace process but I think he has missed out certain ground realities. It seems that he has not considered the political environment of our country or he is too deeply influenced by UN culture or feeling of self-righteousness. In addition, I think, it appears that another flaw in his recommendations stems from not differentiating between a conscripted army and a volunteer army. Has he considered that in a volunteer army like the NA, selections and recruitment are done according to set rules and regulations and there are no short cuts or preferential systems? Furthermore, his suggestion for down sizing of the army should be considered only after assessing our national security and not on the basis of economics. I fully agree with his views about compulsory military service, a Marxist concept to create a politicized citizen army. Without sounding like a literary critique commenting on some written work, I think due credit must be given to him because as a whole his suggestions are well thought out rehabilitation processes if making the peace was the only issue. However in our case, we need to consider if there are any political gambits in the offing. After all, neutral observers fear that secrecy, deception, and betrayal are the major ingredients of revolutions or changes advocated by the Maoists leadership.
It is mainly such fears and the ensuing lack of trust that will create hurdles in the integration process. Neutral observers feel that this mistrust has further deepened by the political commitments and intimidating actions of the Maoists. From the observations made from referring to various media prints, a crisis of confidence exists between the concerned parties. This crisis will escalate if the issue of integration is used as a bargaining chip and later in the process as a sell out for a political compromise among the political adversaries or as a political gambit. It can fizzle out only if the Maoists organization adopts serious confidence building measures (CBMs) through transparent policies implemented by actions to prove that there are no hidden agendas in their quest for integration. They also need to convince that the integrated combatants will not campaign for their ideology. After all, it is the NA that has to prevent “Bolshevik’s influences” in its ranks to remain apolitical and preserve its capabilities to safeguard national security.
These CBMs will be affected by three major factors which are political interests, institutional interest and, self interests. Before considering these factors, it should be noted that besides the Constitutional Monarchial system, there were no victors or vanquished in our internal conflict. It was a third party mediated peace settlement. This may be hard to digest for one security expert campaigning for the Maoist who in one of the discussion forum indicted that since the monarchy was abolished it was a defeat for NA. His logic was based on the remark that war is the means of continuation of the state’s policy made by Clauswitz, a military strategist. This military strategist in his time did not consider internal conflicts but only conventional wars between states. As time passed, scholars started researching concepts of revolutionary warfare, and here strategists like Engels and Marx were quick to point out that in such cases, armed struggle within the state would be one of the means to seize state power. The difference between the two is one is war between states as a means for the continuation of state’s policy and the other is armed struggle within a state to seize state power. In our case, the Maoists launched an armed struggle to seize state power but they have not as yet achieved their goal. I live it to the readers to judge who were the victors or vanquished. However, any compromise made by either party for the purpose of peace should not be taken as weakness or defeat of the concerned side .This may not be an important issue but it has been highlighted here to point out that all agendas including integration would be possible only if there is total consensus among the concerned parties.
With all concerned parties negotiating from equal posture, the most important factor that needs to be considered for CBMs is the political interests. In this sector, firstly the Maoists have to convince state institutions as well as the general public that they will not resort to armed struggle to seize state power even if it means withstanding internal or external pressures. The first step in this direction has already started with the cantonment system. Now it is time to start the second step which could be the return of the arms and ammunition that are in the containers to the state for necessary logistics and agree to government administration within the cantonments with necessary assistance from the UN. This second step should also start a rehabilitation process where the combatants in the cantonment are subjected to counseling by national or international organizations for reintegration into society. There should be no pressure from the leadership in the choice of vocation.
Secondly, the Maoists should not campaign for an atrophying policy to create hurdles in the development and functional aspects of the existing security institutions. For example, the cry for democratizing the army is a political agenda that will affect the professionalism of the soldiers. Every army in the world except where martial law has been imposed follows the system of the state and is under the existing laws and regulations and the question of democratization should not arise unless there is some gambit in the offing.
There are reasons to believe that the demand for democratization is in lines with Engels’s military policy based on doctrine of the democratic army or in other words the nation in arms or creation of a militia force as an alternative to a standing army. This doctrine was fully supported by Marx. It is also Engels who advocated that compulsory military service surpassed general franchise as a democratic agency. He would exclaim that in Germany if compulsory military service was introduced the most reactionary element could be converted into socialist because such service would target the youth population. He favored conscription in order to transform the character of the professional army as well as to arm the nation to defend the nation from external threat. In similar lines, in the name of democratization, the Maoists advocate downsizing the NA and creating a militia force or citizen’s army for similar political reasons. They are supported by some parties who view this from merely economical point of view without giving due thought to the hidden agenda in such demands. Engels was proven wrong because history would show that a conscripted army did not match the power of the standing army. He also miscalculated the staying power and inner dynamics of established institutions. The Maoists should not make the same mistake as Engels and his close friend Marx. The strategist in NA are aware of such moves but are uncertain whether other political forces take seriously another Marxist statement that a new revolution is possible only as a consequence of a new crisis. One crisis is over but are the Maoists waiting for a new crisis to emulate Marx or Mao?
The second major factor is the self interests or social security of all ranks. This factor affects the higher ranks in the hierarchy more than the lower ranks. Besides the loss of job if downsizing occurs, the self interests and social security of those in the present institution that have sweated out for long hard years for the same posts will be affected if the Maoists are directly integrated to such posts.. In addition, there is no shortcut to be a General or a Sergeant in the army or for that matter in any equivalent rank in other security institutions. The knowledge of guerilla tactics or Marxist Maoist revolutionary war concepts is not enough for the modern day general or sergeant. The only possible easy direct integration could take place in the initial recruitment areas like for officers as second lieutenant and for soldiers as recruits. There are also other technical jobs which recruit directly. However, even such integration would be against the laws because it would hamper the rights of the ordinary citizen who may not get the opportunity to compete for the posts in the institutions because of the preferential system for the combatants. Are the Maoists willing to compete for the posts as ordinary citizens? After all, in a democracy all have equal rights and the law is supreme.
The third major factor is the aspect of institutional security. The concept of integration between the rebel army and the state army has been implemented in countries like South Africa which has created problems within their highly professional institution. With indiscipline on the rise and the government cutting down on necessary resources, the South African army is far from what it was before which has hampered their involvement in peacekeeping in Africa under the auspices of the UN. In our case, the integration process may trigger similar situations. In addition we also need to consider that integration would trigger demands from other political organizations for similar assimilation for their cadres. This would make the institution vulnerable to be patronized by various political groups which will affect the present inner dynamics. In a country like ours where there is always the risk of consequences of political polarization, the institution like the army should only be patronized by laws and regulations and the support of the general people. The Maoists should not make integration in the NA a precondition for peace.
At the present moment we are at a crossroad where one path leads to peace and one path leads to violence. The temptation to follow the latter path is very high and during this transitional period we are very susceptible to various vulnerabilities. In a global assessment done by Population Action International, an America based organization, on the demographic risk of civil conflict; Nepal stands out in the very high risk zone. In their assessment we are way above the limits of the stress factor that results in conflicts. In their research they have categorized youth population, rapid urban growth, competition for cropland and fresh water, and HIV/AIDS death in the prime of life as the stress factors. In the case of Nepal the youth population percentage was 45.5% in 2005 which is way above the less than 30% margin. Likewise urban growth in 2005 was 5.1% which categorizes us in the extreme risk zone way above the less than 1% low risk zone. In the factor of competition for cropland, the 2005 data for Nepal show 0.11 hectares per person which is in the high risk zone compared to 0.35 hectares or more for a low risk category. In the factor of freshwater availability we are very comfortable with 7,988 cubic meters per person way below the high risk category of 1000cubic meters or less. These points have been highlighted to show other possible risks that exist for a new crisis to occur. These vulnerabilities coupled with the economic crisis that is looming in the world today are a certain recipe for conflict. It is time for us to unite for peace and not to waste our energies in the pursuit of an outdated ideology to fulfill one’s political ambition. This is the way ahead to facilitate integration of the combatants in various areas.. We must also take note of the fact that it took almost six years for the US Military integration. We need to have patience and, as time passes by, create acceptable CBMs.
(The writer has served in the Nepal Army in various capacities. He retired recently from the Nepal Army. He is a counterterrorism fellowship graduate of National Defense University Washington D.C. He can be reached at dj_rayamajhi@ hotmail.com)
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